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Introduction / Prologue
In a completely different context the Germán President, Johannes Rau,
was recently reported to have said, "Everything has been said, but not
everyone has had his say yet". This could just as easily apply to the
question of corporate govemance. AII manner of opinions, lectures,
dissertations, government papers and diverse codes fill rows of shelves
and it is becoming difficult to distinguish one from the other at a glance.
Corporate Governance is in fashion! I therefore hesitated for some time
before accepting today's invitation. I do not wish to im-pose upon your
time with repetitions of things you have already heard. Further-more, it
was with great ¡nterest that I read the report titled 'The governance of
listed companíes" dated 26 February, 1998 prepared by the Special
Commission to Consider a code of Ethics for Companies' Boards of
Directors with its "Code of Good Governance" (Olivencia Code)1 and the
"Report by the Special Commission to Foster Transparency and Security
in the Markets and in Listed Companies" dated 8 January, 2003 with its
recommendations (Aldama Report)2.
These are very clever papers and recommendations which could well be
exemplary, at least ¡n places where the same basic legal rules apply
(management by a single management body as opposed to a two-tier
model of company management).
But, of course, I am a bad "referee" in Spanish questions and the
(inner-) Germán discussion will only partially interest you because you
have so little grounds for comparison. So what is the best thing to do?
The glut of material available provides the odd advantage, but also
many disadvantages. The total picture gets lost and it becomes
increasingly difficult to decide what are in fact the most important
points. There is a danger that one "cannot see the wood for the trees"
as the saying goes. Perhaps it would therefore be a good ¡dea to go
back and remember the initial questions and to find a standard measure
for the answers insofar as they relate to the key issues in the
discussion. -1 want to try.
See under www.ecgi.org/codes/country-pages/codes-spain.html.
See under www.ecgi.org/codes/country-pages/codes-spain.html.
1. Globalisation: with no historical examples and
experience?
"Globalisation" is he!d up as the guideline, as if world-wide markets
and a - more or less - free world market including different parts of
the earth and their diverse business cultures had not existed in
earlier times3.
1.1 But globalisation is nothing new and nothing unique, as
some if its supporters believe or would have us believe -
partially for obvious reasons of self-interest. Both
supporters and critics of globalisation think, as a rule, of
the internet which spans the world, of transactions made
at breath-taking speed on the money and capital mar-
kets, of the importance of international companies which
have grown to gigantic proportions, closing faetones here
while opening new ones there.
If one understands the term globalisation to mean a
rapidly increasing integration of economies which were
previously geographically separated, what we are
experiencing today is not new. And not even multinational
or international companies are new, ñor are the
revolutionary changes to transport and Communications
systems. Capital was also moved around the world in the
past. Even global debts and curreney crises have a long
history.
And the biggest jump forward in global Communications
traffic took place in the 19th century. When the first
telegraph cable under the Atlantic started to work in 1866
the transmission speed of urgent messages between
Europe and America increased ten thousand-fold. And
only a short time later all stock exchanges of the world
were inter-connected by telegraph. News of events which
affected the prices on the stock exchanges travelled
around the globe within minutes.
For details see Borchardt, Handelsblatt No.112 dated 13.06.2001, P. 7 ("Die
Globalisierung ist nicht unumkehrbar"), whom I owe thanks for the following.
It is significaré that the greater financial crises in the 19th
century were of a world-wide nature, beginning in 1825
with a debt crisis in the states of Central and South
America which had just won their independence. This in
turn caused panic on the European stock exchanges and
led to the Prussian authorities prohibiting trade in South
American stocks for a period of time.
And how mobile people were! In the years from 1820 to
1914 a to-tal of almost 60 million people emigrated from
Europe to destina-tions overseas - the United States,
South or Central America, South África, Australia, New
Zealand, during the years between 1900 and 1914 they
numbered 1,3 million per year. During the same period
millions of people were also moving around within
Europe.
Something which could be described as a "world
economy" was not new in the 19th century, it already
existed in ancient times and in the middle ages; long-
distance economic ties which spanned the world as it was
then known to man. Connections between Eastern and
Central Asia on the one hand and the Orient, África and
Europe on the other were obviously closer than portrayed
by our history books which tend to focus more on Europe.
But the webs which were spun were torn apart again and
again.
It is true that a new "world system" was created when
first Portugal and Spain and then Holland and England
and - fmally - France reached out overseas. But free - or
even multilateral - trade zones did not emerge; instead a
relationship, normally of a monopolistic nature and
organised by the "rulers", was created between the cen-
tre and the periphery.
Is it really so different today - Americanisation in the
guise of global-isation?
1.2 Globalisation was not an on-going process. All earlier
forms of globalisation carne to an end - with a more or
less suelden downfall. This could lead us to assume that
the present globalisation process is not irreversible. That
would be going too far in today's discussion, although it ¡s
worth consideration.
1.3 Without doubt, caution is necessary if reference is made
to global-isation and its - supposedly inevitable -
consequences. This is illus-trated by one German-
American example:
DaimlerChrysIer AG, resulting from the merger between
Daimler Benz AG and Chrysler Corp., is regarded as the
showpiece of globalisation. Jürgen Schrempp, Chairman of
DaimlerChrysIer AG's Management Board, refers to it as
the "World AG". In reality Daim-lerChrysIer AG is an
enterprise which could not possibly be more Germán, even
if it has a - legally dependent - Chrysler división in the
United States.
Large numbers of American Chrysler shareholders got
rid of their DaimlerChrysIer shares very quickly after
the merger with Daimler Benz AG; today only 15 % of
DaimlerChrysIer AG's shareholders are American as
compared with 44 % directly following the merger.4
- As of 2004 the Management Board of DaimlerChrysIer
AG will be made up of 11 members, all of whom, with
the exception of one American (currently two), are
Germán nationals5;
after the merger the Management Board of
DaimlerChrysIer AG was originally made up of 8
Americans and 10 Germans6.
See with ref. to 1999 Wall Street Journal dated 24.03.1999 ("DaimlerChrysIer Frets
Over Loss of U.S. Shareholders") and for 2003 data under www.daimlerchrysler.com
(under Investor Relations, Basic Information, Shareholder Structure).
See DaimlerChrysIer Annual Report 2002, P. 6 / 7.
See DaimlerChrysIer Annual Report 1999, P. 8 / 9.
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Germán Daimler-employees lead and domínate the
foreign di-visions (and subsidiarles); in the case of
Chrysler and Mitsubishi they are in place and act as a
"corps of helpers".
DaimlerChrysIer is headquartered - with heart and soul
- in Stuttgart.
Only the remuneration of the - Germán - DaimlerChrysIer
Management Board ¡s not Germán, it is American, from
the fixed ¡ncome to the various forms of stock options
(shares and phantom stocks)7. Until now, however,
DaimlerChrysIer has behaved in a "Germán" manner with
regard to its (non-) information and (non-) disclosure of
the Board remuneration by individual, taking advantage of
the privi-iege granted to it by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in Form 20 F: individual disclosure is
unnecessary in cases where it is not required in the
company's home country and is not otherwise publicly
disclosed by the company8.
2. Traditions and legal organisation(s): firmly anchored or
interchangeable at will?
2.1 A closer look shows that we are dealing not so much with
internationalisation, but with the superimposition of US
American (legal) structures and corporate by-laws onto
existing European conditions.
But the varying traditions and differences in legal cultures
are such that they cannot simply be stamped out by
superimposing an Anglo Saxon Code of Corporate
Govemance, - whereby it is no coincidence that the
European debate about a code of corporate governance
aróse (boiled up) in connec-tion with the wave of mergers
7
 See DaimlerChrysIer Annual Report 2002, P. 120-122 + 142.
8
 See SEC Form 20-F, ítem 6 Abs. B under www.sec.gov/smbus/forms/20f.htm.
and the stock exchange boom which were seen in the
years from 1998 to 2000.
Law and legal understanding in Continental Europe - also
in Spain and Germany - vary in fundamental aspects from
those in America: on the one hand we see legislative law
with strong Román influ-ence and on the other hand we
nave contract law based on indi-viduals needs (and case
law). Over the years and centuries this has led to different
legal cultures which in turn influence corporate behaviour
(whereby the law firms in the United Sates exercise great
influence). Contrary to the countries in Continental
Europe, the Anglo Saxon countries must avail themselves
of instruments such as codes when they need a binding
ruling.
At the same time two entirely different models of
organisation and leadership meet head-on: the board
system with the Chief Execu-tive Officer in the U.S. and
the two-tier model ¡n Germany with a Management Board
and a Supervisory Board, whereby the Management Board
is a body of equal colleagues (with employee
representation in the Supervisory Board). You do not have
these structural differences between Spain and the United
States.
Any convergence of the systems does nothing to alter the
basic dif-ferences which exist9.
2.2 As far as the question of management remuneration is
concerned, it is necessary to see and to recognise the
historie differences and the - partially religious - variances
in the origins which play a role on both sides of the
Atlantic (or anywhere else). In the United States
competition and success have always had their own
special mean-ing and valué, from the time the first - for
the most part protestant - immigrants began settling the
American continent; work and suc-cess as an expression
See Witt, ZfB Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft-Erganzungsheft 4/2001, Theorie der
Unterrnehmung, P. 73-97 ("Konsistenz und Wandlungsfáhigkeit von Corporate
Governance-Systemen).
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of the endless freedom in the struggle for survival, with
strong religious elements stemming from the Calvinists1
belief ¡n predestination; origins and core elements which
are still valid today as unchanged religious components or
at least as a "religión for the people".
Such origins and / or traditions do not exist in Europe and
the - frequentiy Catholic - countries of central Europe.
Success stands alone as success which in turn has nothing
to do with other religious or quasi-religious points of view;
success in the form of "remuneration" is a personal matter
and is therefore not to be made public; remuneration is
just one part of the interests and considerations that need
to be weighed up, whereby the "rightness" and the - also
social - balance play an important role, at least they did
until the 90's. This holds true for public companies as well
as for prívate enterprise, usually family businesses with
their - either much ad-mired or much abused - patriarchy.
The Germán language also includes the word "Fürsorge",
meaning welfare (the literal translation being "caring for"),
in the business sector, an attitude which has always
distinguished the great Germán companies and
entrepreneurs. As an example one can look back on Firma
Fried. Krupp in Essen with its clinics, coops, employee
apartments or on the voluntary pensión schemes which
exist from one end of the country to the other10.
Is that all part of yesterday and passé because it doesn't
pay in dollars and cents, at least not immediately?
Hopefully not.
Generally the time parameters in Europe have always
been drawn up differently than in the United States when
measuring success: not short-term, measured quarterly
and semi-annually, but mid and long-term in annual or
perennial periods. This is also evident in the duration of
the employment contracts for management (executives):
fixed long-term contracts with well-balanced remuneration
here, short-term termination / redundancy possibilities
10
 See Befe, Else (1994), "Das wird gewaltig ziehen und Früchte tragen!":
Industriepadagogik ¡n den GroBbetrieben des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten
Weltkrieg, dargestelit am Beispiel der Firma Fried.Krupp, Klartext-Verlag, Essen.
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there with a corre-spondingly higher, ¡n some cases
extraordinary, remuneration - but only - for the successful
(contracts originally without "golden hand-shakes" or
"parachutes").
2.3 In the - global - conflict between principáis and agents,
which has been increasingly decided in favour of the
agents in listed public companies, the agents are
concerned with securing the best of both worlds for
themselves: long-term contracts on the one hand (with
redundancy provisions if the contract is terminated
prematurely) and variable compensation packages (stock
options) on the other, which are completely beyond any
acceptable limits and which have nothing - but their
formal criteria - to do with success; at least they define
success differently for the agents than for the principáis.
Lawyers, auditors and other consultants are always
available to "accommodate" the expectations and interests
of the management. We'll go into this in more detail later.
3. Origin(s) of the Code: misunderstandings or conflict of
aims?
A look at the Germán discussion on the code, which started ¡n 1999
and continued till the end of 2001, and the development of the
Germán Corpo-rate Governance Code dated 26 February, 2002
"confirm" the differing starting points11.
3.1 Initially there was a misunderstanding on the part of the
analysts and (institutional) investors, most of whom have
an Anglo Saxon bias. They did not understand - or chose
to ignore - that all the sali-ent points of Germán corporate
governance are, both in general and in detail, anchored in
and provided for by legislation and that only - very - little
room remains for further rules and regulations, quite the
opposite to Anglo Saxon legal tradition. And for this
reason the purpose of a - any - Germán code of corporate
governance is first and foremost that of communication,
See Bernhardt, DER BETRIEB, H. 36 dated 06.09.2002, P. 1841-1846 ("Der
Deutsche Coproate Governance Kodex: Zuwahl (comply) oder Abwahl (explain)?" -
P. 1841).
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not regulation. This ¡s no mean feat, and something
completely different to "Germán Code of Corporate
Govemance" which was being called for. There remains
(only) a little leeway for such recommendations as help
transíate the "letter of the law" into actions or those which
make best use of the - existing - possibilities. It is a matter
of experience, of "best practice" as it is frequently called
(and not of a codex in the Román legal sense).
3.2 Both of the Germán government commissions on
corporate govemance (Baums and Cromme) were well
aware of this of course and they placed themselves at the
"head of the movement" where they were best positioned
to reduce any demands made by a code which might be
too far-reaching. For this reason Germany had to nave
one uniform code instead of letting the marketplace reach
its own decisión - although it was well-known that in the
United States there are a number of (company) codes, all
of which co-exist quite peacefully. The "Deutschland AG"
representing the network within Germán industry wanted
to avoid any such competition between codes in order to
retain control over the events surrounding corporate
govemance. Ut aliquid fíat, was the motto12.
As a consequence the Germán Corporate Govemance
Code contains nothing, or very little, which could not be
signed without even a cursory glance, quite apart from the
fact that much of it is merely a repetition of legal
requirements. Much more meaningful are the omissions;
things which ought to have been included in the code if
"best practice" is the aim. And many people who had
expected the code to "make a mark13" are very
disappointed - and quite rightly so.
See Bemhardt, DER BETRIEB, H. 36 dated 06.09.2002, P. 1841 ff. ("Der Deutsche
Corporate Govemance Kodex: Zuwahl (comply) oder Abwahl (explain)?" - P. 1841).
WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE No. 6 dated 31.01.2002, P. 66 ("Der groBe Bluff');
Handelsblatt No. 41 dated 27.02.2002, P. 8 ("Der groBe Bruder aus Amerika lásst
grüBen"); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 49 dated 27.02.2002, P. 15
("Schwammige Gebote" und "Fünfzig Regeln für Vorstande und Aufsichtsrate");
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 52 dated 02.03.2002, P. 23 (Die Kodex-
Kommission hat eine Chance verpaBf); Handelsblatt No. 47 dated 07.03.2002, P.
31 (Aktionarsschützer kritisíeren Corporate Governance-Kodex"); Frankfurter
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The Spanish Aldama-Code is much deverer because ¡t
contains far-reaching recommendations and at the same
time considere company codes or codes for a given branch
of industry to be possible or even advisable14.
3.3 Observance of the Germán Corporate Governance Code -
it is not (legally) binding - is based on "interpiay" between
legal norm and prívate code.
On May 17, 2002 the Germán parliament passed a law
further reforming the Stock Corporation Act with the
inclusión of the Trans-parency and Disclosure Act. One
part of this law ¡s a "declaration of conformity with the
Corporate Governance Code". This refers to the so-called
declaration of compliance with § 161 of the Stock
Corporation Act in the new versión (n.V.)
"Management Board and Supervisory Board of a
listed company declare annually that the
recommendations made by the "Government
Commission on the Germán Corporate Governance
Code" which are published by the Ministry of
Justice in the official part of the electronic "Federal
Gazette " were and are complied with or which
recommendations were or are not observed. The
declaration will be made available to the share-
holders."15
The Transparency and Disclosure Act (TransPuG) has its
origins in the report made by the "Government
Commission on Corporate Governance" (Baums) in the
year 200116 and makes provisions for some of the report's
recommendations; at the same time § 161 of the Stock
Allgemeine Zeitung No. 93 dated 22.04.2002, P. 18 ("Kodex wirkt nur bei
Verhaltensánderung").
See Section VI No. 1 ("Self-regulation principie").
Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und
Publizitá't (Transparenz- und Publizitátsgesetz), Bundesgesetzblatt (2002) Teil I No.
50, dated 25.07.2002.
Baums (Hrsg.), Report of the Government Commission Corporate Governance,
Veriag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Koln (2001).
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Corporation Act n.V. provides a basis for the rules of be-
haviour which were developed by the "Government
Commission on Germán Corporate Governance Code"
(Cromme) in 2001/200217. The declaration of conformity
with the Corporate Governance Code (comply or explain)
refers to the "Germán Corporate Governance Code",
developed by the commission, whereby its "stipulations"
vary from legally binding rules ("must stipulations"), to
strong recommendations ("ought to stipulations") and
mere suggestions ("should or can stipulations"), - which
does not serve to simplify matters, particularly for an
outsider (function of communication).
According to § 161 Stock Corporation Act n.V. listed
companies are required to consider whether they have
conformed - completely or partially - with the Code. The
decisión not to comply with sections of the code requires
no explanation (contrary to the misleading expression
"declaration of conformity" or "explain"). An
announcement by the listed company in question that the
"Germán Corporate Governance Code" has not been
adopted - as a whole or partially -, or that the company
forgoes any code or that the company prefers its own
"code of best practice" to the "uniform codes" suffices18.
This also applies to the "corrections" to the code which
were made in 2003 (in the amended versión dated 21
May, 2003)19.
Government Commission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex (DCG-Kodex), See under http:/www.corporate-
govemance-code.de.
See Bernhardt, DER BETRIEB, H. 17 dated 25.04.2003, P. I
("Entsprechenserklárungen mit Lücken und Tücken").
See under www.corporate-govemance-code.de.Tightening up the code by altering
the ruling on disclosure of Management Board remuneration from a "can" into an
"ought to" stipulation is helpful, but was "due" anyway. Whoever wants to make use
of American remuneration models and standards must also accept the drawbacks
and, ¡f they are not going to be asked in advance, at least inform the shareholders.
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4. Business Culture and Leadership Structure deeply rooted
or incidental?
4.1 Law, the interpretation of law and the reality of law leave
their mark. The same applies to the different systems of
organisation and management. The system of
management by a single body with the Chairman and Chíef
Executive Officer "works" differently to the two-tier system
of Management Board and Supervisory Board with the
cotlective leadership / responsibility - and the Chairman of
the Board (only) as "first among equals"20. Employee
representation in a Germán Supervisory Board serves to
make the differences greater.
4.2 More important: the public company, whether listed or not,
possesses as a legal entity its own "weight" and "valué";
Germán legal tradition has developed the expression "the
company as such". The public company is more that just
an "extensión" of the shareholders or a mirror-image of the
shareholders; to an even lesser extent may a public
company be ¡dentified with its "leaders" such as
management and Supervisory Board, who lead and
represent, but do not personify the company. Germán
public companies therefore "live" differently than
comparable companies in the United States; this was at
least true until a few years ago.
As already mentioned, the Anglo Saxon timeframes also
vary. Put-ting the focus on - fast - profit and the - so-
called - shareholder valué detracts from the fact that:
a company - to the European and Germán way of
thinking - is more than the sum of figures - of short-
term validity - and stock prices;
a company comprises shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors and its "environment";
Bernhardt / Witt, ZfB Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 69. 3g. (1999), H. 8, P. 825 -
845 ("Unternehmensleitung ¡m Spannungsfeld zwischen Ressortverteilung und
Gesamtverantwortung").
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a company is set up with the long term ¡n mind and
therefore has an inherent valué (which ¡s not limited
to the daily stock prices);
so-called stock exchange-orientated measures (such
as out-sourcing or the buying back of the company's
own shares21) may have a short-term positive
¡nfluence on the share price causing it to rise, but
(can) sooner or later cause - lasting - damage to the
company.
In the course of the falsely understood and abbreviated
search for "valué finding" or "valué orientation" which are
- at face valué - limited to shareholder valué, the "hard
facts" as well as the - quite wrongly mocked - "soft points"
are all too frequently overlooked. In European
understanding companies are more than just a frame-
work for figures, an employee is more that just a
"counter". It is not purely by chance that many mergers
fail, one of the causes of the Corporate Governance
debate (and of the "valué creation"), either very quickly or
over a period of time, no matter how successful they
appear to be at the beginning; the blossoms (synergetic
effects) turn out to be nothing but artificial flowers22.
"All that counts is the company's capability in the future.
And one can only ensure a good future if employees and
management, as well as the shareholders, are enthusiastic
in their approach to a mutual goal. Tíiose who make
shareholder valué the guideline for their actions cannot
ensure a good future", the Chief Executive of Dr. Ing. h.c.
F. Porsche, Wiedeking, said - quite rightly23.
4.3 Employee representaron is an integral part of the Germán
form of corporate leadership. Employee representation /
See F.A.Z. No. 91 dated 17.04.2003, P. 20 ("Marktwert-Márchen").
Bemhardt, (2000), Corporate Govemance, An International Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, P.
327 ff. (Acquisitions, Mergers and Cancellations in Germany - ¡n the white water of
shareholder valué").
Bórsen-Zeitung No. 15 dated 23.01.1999, P. 6. ("Shareholder Valué nicht alies").
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co-determination takes place locally in the plant vía the
works council and co-determination at company /
leadership level takes place in the Management Board (the
director for employee relations) and in the Supervisory
Board where the employees and the shareholders are
represented in equal numbers, where, however, the
chairman of the Supervisory Board has a second - deciding
- vote to resolve stalemate situations. Co-determination on
enterprise-level originated as law of the occupying power
applicable in the ¡ron and steel works in the British zone
after 1945, a stipulation which was later carried over to
companies in the coal mining industry. The mining
industry had a special status, which - albeit with many
restrictions - was extended in 1975 to comprise all limited
companies with more than 2,000 employees24.
Opinions on the advantages or disadvantages vary - also
in Ger-many - depending on one's own interests, and that
not only between industry and trade unions, on-stage or
behind the scenes. In connection with the merger of
Daimler and Chrysler Jürgen Schrempp, the chairman of
the Management Board of the company then known as
Daimler Benz AG, for example, referred to co-
determination as an advantage for Germany as an
industrial location25- whatever his reason may nave been.
An expertise prepared by the Bertelsmann Trust in 1998
also argües in this direction26. Others on the other hand
regard co-determination at enterprise level as a
disadvantage to industry and demand its abolition or
limitation (without the slightest chance of success in
Germán parliament, no matter which party is in power)27.
See co-determination laws under www.bundesregierung.de/Gesetze.
See Handelsblatt No. 116 dated 22.06.1998, P. 21 ("Bei der Managementvergütung
sollen neue Wege gegangen werden").
Bertelsmann Stiftung Hans-Bockler-Süftung (Hrsg.) Bericht der Kommission
Mitbestimmung, ("Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen - Bilanz und
Perspektiven") Verlag Bertelsmann Stlftung, Gütersloh 1998.
Henzler, Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 218 dated 19.09.2000, P. 27 ("Das
marktgetriebene Führungsmodell hat Zukunft", Kopper, DIE ZEIT No. 18 dated
26.04.2001, P. 21 ("Das slnd absurde Zustande"), Ulmer, ZHR 166 (2002), P. 271 -
277 ("Paritá'tische Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat von
GroBuntemehmen - noch zeitgemáS?"), Baums, Frankfurter Allgemeine
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Contrary to the intentions of the British, co-determination
did not prevent the revival of the mining ¡ndustry after the
second world war. In the same way Germany's return to
former economic strength from the miserable state in
which we find ourselves at present will not be prevented
by co-determination, no matter how much of a hindrance
it may frequently be. Management Boards in Germany
nave the least cause for complaint - as far as their own
affairs are concerned. The - for the most part
unacceptable - transfer of American remuneraron
schemes to Germany in the years since 1997, both in
absoiute amounts and contení (stock opoptions) could
only be attained with the agreement of the Supervi-sory
Boards (or their sub-committees for questions of
remuneration), in which parity rules - whatever reasoning
the unions may have had (this point has become
particularly clear in the Mannesmann / Vodafone affair
which made the headlines at home and abroad)28.
It is, however, a procedure particular to Germany, which
finds nei-ther understanding ñor support beyond our
borders, whether in Europe or elsewhere and which will
therefore not be spread further within the framework of
European corporate governance29. But co-determination
influences the artides of Germán corporations (and it
would not go hand in hand with the board system of
management).
Sonntagszeitung No. 18 dated 04.05.2003, P. 29 ("Die Aufsichtsráte sind zu grol3"),
Neubürger, Borsen-Zeitung No. 184 dated 24.09.2003, P. 5 ("Pládoyer für Reform
der Mitbestimmung"); see also Handelsblatt No. 172 dated 06.09.2001, P.25
("Breuer fordert Reform der Mitbestimmung") und Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
No. 250 dated 27.10.2001, P. 16 ("Breuer kritisiert deutsche Mitbestimmung"),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 146 dated 27.06.2003, P. 11 ("Die
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer am Pranger") und Handelsblatt No. 121 dated
27./28. 06.2003; P. 14 ("Mitbestimmung bleibt Reizthema").
Dunsch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 220 dated 22.09.2003, P. 1 ("Das
Millionenspiel bei Mannesmann").
Jeske, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 169 dated 24.07.2001, P. 15 (Das Tabú
der Mitbestimmung"), Bohl, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 219 dated 20.09.03,
P. 14 ("Die Mitbestimmung irritiert die auslándischen Investoren").
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5. Remuneration / Remuneraton guidelines (Management
Board and Supervisor/ Board): payment for services
rendered or self-service?
Corporate governance also encompasses the question of
remuneration of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board
or - in the case of the board model - the remuneration of the CEO
and the directors.
5.1 Germán Management Boards (and Supervisory Boards), or
at least a good many of their members in prominent
positions, have shown a twofold interest in the American
"example" since the end of the 90's
they are interested in the unique all-encompassing
power of the CEO as a management form; the
chairman of the Management Board as the "managing
director" instead of a "first among equals" (Primus
inter Pares)30 and
they are ¡nterested in the - until then unthinkable -
amounts paid to American executives, with their
extensive compensation packages, particularly their -
often enough horrendous - stock options with their
frequently risk-free "pre-requisites" which must be
fulfilled before the options can be exercised.
The wave of mergers, the development on the stock
exchanges which were rising steeply (till 2000) and the
corporate governance discussion offered a welcome
opportunity, to alter the European remuneration structures
See Bemhardt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 45, P. Wl ("Das Kollegialprinzip
¡m Vorstand gegen den Ansturm starker Mánner schützen"), Bernhardt, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung No. 24 dated 29.01.2002, P. 18 ("Eine Rückkehr zum
Generaldirektor ist nicht wünschenswert"), v. Hein, ZHR 166 (2002), P. 464-502
("Vom Vorstandsvorsitzenden zum CEO?"), Hoffman-Becking, Neue Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht 16/2003 dated 15.08.2003, P. 745 - 792 (Vorstandsvorsitzender
oder CEO?"). See also auch zur derzeitígen Diskussion ¡n USA Bórsen-Zeitung No. 6
dated 10.01.2003, P. l("US-Experten verlangen Trennung der Posten von Chairman
und CEO"), Handelsblatt No. 7 dated 10. / 1 1 . Januar 2003, P. 11 ("Allmachtige US-
Firmenchefs sollen an die kurze Leine"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 38
dated 14.02.2003, P. 11 ("Weniger Macht für den CEO").
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and - ¡n many companies - "to turn every-thing upside
down". The beginning was made by two Germán
"showpieces", Deutsche Bank AG and Daimler Benz AG,
with their stock option plans ¡n 1996. This was obviously
the most important part of the corporate governance
debate and reason enough to keep the debate going31,
Germán leadership structures and Germán business
culture forgotten.
Numerous were and are the reasons and excuses.
Supposedly ¡t is the only way to attract experienced and
highly qualified men (or women) to posts on the
Management Boards or Supervisory Boards of Germán
companies. A false argument, particularly as members of
the Management Board are typically chosen "from within"
- for good reasons: they know the company best of all and
because "2nd level" Management must also have a chance
to "make their way" to the top32. And for its Supervisory
Boards the "Deutschland AG" chooses ¡ts "own". And thus
very little has changed in the boardrooms in the last years
despite all new forms of remuneration. Also the
comparisons with prominent sport or show celebrities
seem strangely forced and unfitting (without going into
great detail).
"Everything gets dearer, only the excuses get cheaper"; I
read somewhere recently.
5.2 In the meantime the remuneration of the Management
Boards of numerous - not all! - Germán DAX companies
has reached heights and proportions which have earned
harsh criticism because, even with the best will in the
world, it is not possible to reasonably justify such
dimensions,- and particularly not in years when banks and
industry alike are making thousands and thousands of
See Bernhardt, Corporate Govemance - An International Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, P. 123-
135, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 110 dated 12.05.2001, P. 24 ("Deutsche
Bank plant weitere Anreize für Führungskráfte" und "Vollversorger"), Bernhardt,
FINANZ BETRIEB, H. 7/8 2001, P. 427 ff.
See Handelsblatt No. 179 dated 17.09.2003, P. 15 ("Mercedes-Chef will internen
Nachfolger").
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employees redundant ¡n order to adjust their costs in
answer to the changing markets.
Not only public opinión but also prominent voices from
the side of the industrialists such as the President of the
Federal Association of Germán Industry (Bundesverbands
der Deutschen Industrie) have spoken of frightening
examples, of scandals, of a self-service mentality and of
the "greed" of many a Management Board member33,
Bad examples spoil good habits (and can quickly destroy
the basic understanding which prevails in an industrial
society).
5.3 There was talk recently both in the United States and in
Germany about the possibility of stock options being given
up, but they will probably not be given up, being altered
instead to become less ob-vious and - as far as the
developments on the stock exchanges are concerned -
less risky34.
Whoever wishes to have unlimited (height) and / or
unrestricted (time) eamings, must become an
entrepreneur; he will then have all possible chances, but
must also bear the risks, he will then be owner-
Rogowski, M., ¡n Beriiner Zeitung No. 114 dated 17. / 18.03.2003, P. 28 ("Bei
einigen gab es Exzesse") und ¡n Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 149 dated 02.07.2003, P.
17 (Industrie-Prá'sident kritisiert Manager"), see also Quandt, J. in Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung No. 143 dated 24.06.2003, P. 9 (Traumgehalter schaffen keine
Kultur des Anstands"), manager magazin No. 8/01, P. 46 ff. ("Die maBlose Élite"),
Handelsblatt No. 84 dated 02.05.2002, P. 13 ("US-Manager sahnen kraftig ab"),
RHEINISCHE POST No. 108 dated 11.05.2002 ("Absahnen in der Krise"),
Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 174 dated 31.07.2003, P. 18 ("Bonus für die Chefetage").
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 145 dated 26.06.2003, P. 20, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung No. 156 dated 09.07.2003, P. 15 ("Wir überlegen, ob wir mit
den Aktienoptionen so weitermachen wie bisher"), Borsen-Zeitung No, 130 dated
10.07.2003, P. 1 ("Ende der Stock-Otions-Ára") und P. 9 ("Microsoft gibt keine Stock
Options mehr aus"), FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 10.07.2003, P. 27
("Optionen haben ausgedient"), Handelsblatt No. 130 dated 10.07.2003, P. 14 ("Die
Aktienoption "pur" wird immer mehr zum AuslaufmodeH"), Süddeutsche Zeitung No.
156 dated 10.07.2003, P. 17 ("Manager müssen auf Aktienoptionen verzichten"),
Borsenzeitung No. 149 dated 06.08.2003, P. 1 (Optionen werden entsorgt"),
Neubürger, H.-J. in Borsen-Zeitung No. 184 dated 24.09.2003, P. B7
("Aktienoptionsprogramme werden an Bedeutung verlieren").
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entrepreneur, Le. principal and agent in one. Whoever, on
the other hand, shies away from taking on the entire risk,
must be more "modest" and be satisfied with a balanced
relationship between services rendered and payment for
those services ("not let things get out of proportion", as
Cromme, the Chairman of the Code Commission, said
recently).
To avoid misunderstandings: the issue is not or not only
the law (§ 87 AktG), it is a matter of fairness and decency,
in other words what is right and fitting. Moderation
instead of extravagance; remuneration instead of making
oneself unjustifiably rich.
Management Boards must be - or ought to be - the living
example of what they expect from their employees at all
levéis, showing that performance and reward, work and
payment balance.
6. Market and Economic / Business Ethics: opposing or
synonymous?
6.1 In the discussions on the subject of "valué", which for
many does not extend beyond the - alleged - shareholder
valué and - first and foremost - management valué and
stock options, another aspect is disappearing more and
more from sight: the question of the extent to which
moral valúes (still) have (or are allowed to have) any
meaning for business dealings - or the extent to which
they are compromised for the sake of success (although
this would never be said with such clarity). A business
"ethic" is the issue, - a point which is referred to several
times in the Aldama Report35.
Otto Wolff von Amerongen, one of our great
entrepreneurs of the last half century, spoke of a "basic
moral order for the globalised world" and pointed out, "a
See Secüon II I No. 3 ("The ethical framework of corporate govemance").
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free economy ... cannot survive without individual
moráis"36.
However, public discussion frequentiy follows a completely
different course or the "moral" requirements are "watered
down" so long and to such an extent that very little
remains to be demanded or fol-lowed up on. Along with
the laws and regulations which govern business dealings
the central issue is purely and simply what used to be self-
evident natural rules of human behaviour, of leadership, of
reliability and trust, of observing a gentlemen's agreement
and of keeping one's word; rules which ought to apply ¡n a
business environment - as they do anywhere else. But
even mentioning such criteria frequentiy does not fit in
with today's expectations, which measure everything in
terms of (market) success alone and all too often ignore
the fact that the market is not something omnipotent
which takes care of and replaces everything else in life. "If
some-one believes in the market (only), he is
superstitious", wrote Hans Küng 20 years ago. His words
still holds true today: "Neither the state ñor the market
may be exalted to the position of a false deity .... Market
valúes are not at issue, but the valué of life; not the
standard of living, but the quality of life, not a consumer
society, but a cultural society"37.
Otto Wolff von Amerongen said something similar in
199838. "The market economy does not provide a space
devoid of moral standards, ñor can it forgo individual
moráis." Others speak of a certain basic moral
understanding, "without which business dealings are
(would be) marked by distrust and uncertainty", adding,
however, that in the long term the market alone can
successfully bundle and balance interests" (Breuer) 39 -
thus indeed a "market-based religión"?
36
 Handelsblatt dated 23.12.98, P. 42 (("Marktwirtschaft kommt ohne individuelle
Moral nicht aus").
37
 Hans Küng, Ókonomie und Gottesfrage, Reutlinger Reden, Heft 5 (1980) - P. 6 + 7.
38
 See footnote 36.
39
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 2 dated 04.01.1999. P. 8 ("Offene
Bürgergesellschaft in der globalisierten Weltwirtschaft").
20
6.2 Here ¡s neither the time ñor the place to summarise or
even attempt to summarise - no matter how briefly -
today's understanding of economic and business ethics. A
short versión would (or could) easily lead to
misunderstandings, a lengthy balanced summary would go
too far here.
Furthermore, many publications are available which sum
up the situation - all worth-while reading - and at the
same time present and go into the details of the varying
opinions. (Karen Use Hom40, Brigitte Herrmann41, Karl
Homann / Franz Blome-Drees42, Peter Ul-rich43, Horst
Steinmann44 and recently Karl Homann45 and Josef
Wieland46 to ñame just a few.)
The definition of the terms economic ethics
(Wirtschaftsethik) and business ethics
(Unternehmensethik) are meaningful (whereby -
unfortunately - a clear differentiation is frequently missing
from the discussion and / or the actual differences are not
made sufficiently clear)47.
Economic ethics have to do with structures, business
ethics have to do with behaviour. Economic ethics deal
with the general conditions which prevail and with
40
 Karen Use Horn .Mora l und Wir tschaf t™, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1996
41
 Brigit te Her rmann , "Unternehmenseth ik , Konzepte - Grenzen - Perspekt iven", ZfB,
Ergánzungsheft 1/92 / P. 1 ff. ("Wirtschaftsethik - Stand der Forschung").
42
 Karl Homann und Franz Blome-Drees: Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, UTB für
Wissenschaft, Vandenhoeck, 1992
43
 Peter Ulrich: Integrative Wirtschaftsethik, Haupt Verlag, 1997.
44
 Horst S te inmann und Alber t Lohr: Grund lagen der Unternehmenseth ik , Poeschel
Ver lag, 1 9 9 1 .
45
 Karl H o m a n n , Govemanceeth ik und phi losophische Ethik m i t okonomischer Methode
- Versuch einer Verhal tn isbest immung, zfwu Zeitschrift fü r Wirtschafts- und
Unternehmensethik, Jahrgang 2 / Heft 1 (2001) / P. 34 ff.
46
 Josef Wieland, Eine Theor ie der Govemanceethik, z fwu Zeitschrift fü r Wirtschafts-
und Unternehmensethik, Jahrgang 2 / Heft 1 (2001) / P. 8 ff.
47
 See Karen Use Horn, Frankfurter Al lgemeine Zeitung dated 31 .05 .01 , P. 21 (,,Nur
solche Gescháfte machen, dass man nachts ruhig schlafen kann") ; Karl Homann /
Franz Bloeme-Drees, Unternehmensethik - Managementethik, DBW 55 (1995) P. 95
ff.
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conducting business, business ethics concern themselves
with the way in which things are done and with behaviour
in daily business (whereby it remains unclear whether in
business ethics reference is made to the business or the
businessman, to the company or the management)48.
In either case the relationship is addressed between
market and moráis, economics and ethics. Arguments and
counter-arguments are:
Antagonism (Kant) or (merely) "different aspects of one
and the same behaviour pattern which must be seen in
varying contexts simultaneously"49, philosophic ethics ¡n
terms of economics"50, "economics as ethics by different
means"51.
Are we dealing with utilitarian ethics, the economy of
moralism52 or, more or less, with an ethically disguised
utilitarianism53?
"Increase profit with ethical behaviour"54 may well be an
attractive goal, but it cannot always be achieved,
frequently the opposite will hold true (or be closer to the
truth). What then? "Ethics are also economically
worthwhile", says Krelle55. And if not?
With the definition of economic ethics as being a
structural issue the - necessary - framework has been
addressed, but the frame-work as such is not defined
(accepted or not).
48
 See dazu u.a. Karl Homann / Franz Bloeme-Drees, Wirtschafts- und
Unternehmensethik, a.a.O / P. 25.
49
 Karl Homann / Franz Blome-Drees ¡n DBW 55 / P. 111).
50
 Karl Homann zfwu a.a.O / P. 38).
51
 Karl Homann in Süddeutsche Zeitung dated 12. Márz 2001 / S, 24 ("Ethik mit
besseren Mitteln").
52
 Hans Willgerodt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung dated 16.12.00 / P. 15 ("Privates
Glück und offentliche Wohltat").
53
 s iehe dazu auch die kr i t ische Arbei t von Olaf J. Schumann (2000) : Wir tschaf tseth ik
und Radikaler Konstrukt iv ismus, Hampp Ver lag , 2000.
54
 See Frankfur ter A l lgemeine Zei tung dated 20 .10 .01 / P. 20 .
55
 Wi lhe lm Krel le, "Unternehmenseth ik , Konzepte - Grenzen - Perspekt iven", Z fB-
Ergánzungsheft 1/92 / P. 35 ff ("Ethik lohnt sich auch okonomisch").
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Are there guidelines and limits? And if so, where do they
come from and who defines them? In more concrete
terms: what are the rules of play in a free market and in
a - social - market economy? What are the main criteria
of a competitive society and of an (ordo) liberal
programme for the economy? And what about the
guarantee of freedom and (social) justice - as a part of
human dignity?
Does the market - success or failure - decide anything
and everything, or do predetermined, overriding valúes
exist which escape the influence of the market?
6.3 The economy has - more and more as time goes on -
become independent to a great extent and determines
what happens. At the same time a "consensus on valúes"
is lacking in society - contrary to earlier times. Under these
circumstances there is wide scope for economic ethics
which analyse the criteria and limitations of bus-ness
dealings and do not avoid conflict56. Adapting does not
suffice; it is inadequate, "to make moráis supple, suitable
for the market, which in everyday life means that ethics
are reduced to economics," were Konrad Adam's critical
remarks on economic ethics57.
Just because ethics is written on the outside does not
mean that the contents are ethics.
A general reference to an ethical compass ¡n borderline
questions - also - in connection with corporate
governance is therefore insufficient.
,,Strategische Náchstenliebe" aus Sorge um ,,Global ReputatiorT mag nützlich sein,
reicht aber ais Messlatte für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik nicht aus (See
dazu Hans Caspar von der Crone, Neue Züricher Zeitung dated 27./28.01.01, P. 29
- ,,Corporate Govemance und Reputation" - und Thomas Rschermann, DIE ZEU
dated 31.05.01, P. 21 - ,,Strategische Náchstenliebe"). Es geht um mehr ais
"Greenwash" und ,,Weichmacher".
Konrad Adam ¡n FAZ dated 01.04.00, Beilage Bilder und Zeiten / P. I. ("Die
Dienstleistungsgesellschaft - Ein vorsorglicher Abgesang").
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6.4 In the end ¡t comes down to the honourable merchant58
(kóniglicher Kaufmann) as he used to be called, a term
which is frequently being used again today, who
recognises moderation and goal and knows how to
balance the "jus bonum et aequum", quite independent of
all legislative rulings (or loopholes). It is a question of
what ¡s "right and good".
Exemplary people are needed - not would-be legends of
shareholder valué such as Jack Welch who, first and
foremost, took care of himself - far beyond the cali of
duty59.
In his speech held in St. Gallen on May 15, 1972 ('The
total Responsibility of the Corporation"), which was re-
printed on the occasion of his 85th birthday on January
24, 1999, Joachim Zahn, who used to be the Chairman of
the Management Board of Daimler Benz AG pointed out
the following: "With freedom comes responsibility, on the
other hand responsibility is not possible without freedom.
So if this freedom is to correspond to the responsibility,
there must be a corresponding economic moral code. ...
Most ¡mportant are those who set examples by the way in
which they live and act."
The Germán President, Johannes Rau said something
similar recently: "Everyone is looking for someone to look
up to. People search for them and people need them."60
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung No. 12 dated 10.08.2003, P. 36 ("Der
ehrbare Kaufmann"), Borsen-Zeitung No. 164 dated 27.08.2003, P. 8 ("Auf
Kaufmannsehre").
See Handelsblatt No. 181 dated 19.09.2003, P. 18 ("Das BHd vom gierigen
Millionár").
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung No. 14 dated 24.08.2003, P. 4 ("Nicht
weniger Alte, sondem mehr Junge").
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7. Criteria / Standards of European Codes: made to
measure or off the peg?
7.1 The Anglo Saxon example, from the board model to the
power of the Chief Executive Officers, has lost much of its
splendour ¡n the past years. All the scandals in the
American industrial and banking sectors since Enron are
not - serious - "accidents" or unbelievable negligence on
the part of the governing bodies and auditors, they stem
from serious flaws in the corporate governance system
there, which have now become (only too) obvious;
including "disenchantment" with the auditors and
accounting in accordance with US GAAP and the New York
Stock Exchange (Grasso)61. The answer has come in the
form of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Law and a series of court
cases against companies, banks, first and foremost the
investment banks, auditors and their leading
representatives62.
Any self-satisfaction or malicious glee on the part of the
Europeans would be out of place.
On the other hand, there is no reason whatsoever to
accept American corporate governance structures and
codes which have failed in more than just the odd case
here and there. And in particular there is no good reason
to allow our legal and business cultures which have grown
over the centuries to founder and sink in a sea of -
imaginary - globalisation. A little more self-confidence
would be in place.
Good business leadership is needed, not new-fashioned
corporate governance.
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 212 dated 12.09.2003, P. 21 ("Wer ¡st der
gierigste Mann ¡n New York?") und Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 218 dated
19.09.2003, P. 23 ("SchluBglocke für Richard Grasso").
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 209 dated 06.09.2003, P. 28 ("Dumme
Michkühe").
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7.2 It would appear that the board model, which was held up
as a shining example for a long time, and was supposedly
superior to the Germán two-tier system, has lost much of
its attraction anyway; although the "separation" of
Management and Supervisory Boards is still ¡n demand
where on the one hand the - supposed - CEO ¡s concerned
and on the other hand the so-called Chairman. In
Germany that probably has to do with the fact that many
protagonists of the board model have moved on from the
Management Board, where they were not seldom
chairman, to the Supervisory Board63. "Location alters the
point of view" as the saying goes.
What does all this mean for the standards and the core
issues in the continuation of the European corporate
governance debate?
There will be many different answers varying from country
to country, from company to company as well as
consensus in many basic points. Here I can only show the
Germany picture. The "criteria" are:
A. Clear separation of law and code
This is a basic point which surprisingly enough
sometimes seems to slip people's minds: the Stock
Corporation Act, the Act on Companies with Limited
Liability, or the Commercial Code, with all their
stipulations applying to corporate governance, are
one thing, codes of good governance are voluntary
and thus something quite different. It is important
to withstand all attempts and all ideas / desires -
obvious or otherwise - to blur or confuse the two. It
is the general understanding - also internationally -
that a "Code of Corporate Governance" is not a law,
ñor is it a directive, it is instead a collection of
suggestions and "instructions for use" with regard
See Schmidt, A. / HypoVereinsbank ¡n WELT am SONNTAG No. 18 dated
04.05.2003, P. 27 ("Warum haben Sie nicht Nein gesagt?"), Handelsblatt dated
08.05.2003, P. 10 ("Der Club der alten Herrén"), Süddeutsche Zeitung dated
15.05.2003, P. 21 ("Dle Deutschland AG lebt").
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to how legal stipulations may best be put into
practice, how the alternatives which are allowed by
law may be used to the full advantage. It is, ¡n fact,
a matter of experience, "best practice" as it is
frequently called (Code of Best Practice), to avoid
the use of the word "recipe".
The expression "soft law" which is heard from time
to time is misleading. It is a contraction in terms
and demonstrates the general confusión of
expressions. The "mixture" of law and corporate
governance code in the form of § 161 AktG is a
blunder.
B. Made to measure instead of off the peg
A clear definition facilitates competition for the best
"code of good governance" or at least ¡t could do
so; for competition can, indeed it must exist -
instead of regulation or standardisation, which is
what many desire who otherwise talk of nothing but
"de-regulation"64.
No mention is made of the corporate identity which
makes things non-interchangeable. This shows how
quickly fashions change.
Why should there not be different attempts and
suggestions for a code of corporate governance,
which must eam and keep their place in the
competition / clash, with different criteria or core
issues? What good is to be gained from one uniform
code?
The Spanish Aldama Report with its corresponding
passages is on the right track65.
Recently artides have been appearing about "regulation hysterics" or "over-
regulation"; see Kley ¡n Borsen-Zeitung No. 51 dated 14.03.2003, P. 8 (Schluss m'it
der Regulierungshysterie") and von Rosen in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No.
187 dated 14.08.2003, P. 18 ("Die Überregulierung behindert den Kapitalmarkt").
See Section VI No. 1 "Self-regulation principie".
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Around us - not least of all in the United States,
which are al-ways held up as an example - there
are several different codes. And ¡t ¡s better to let the
market - that is in this case the companies and the
big investors - decide what they think is desirable
rather than trusting semí-ofRcial regulations.
C. No "Round Tables" and no "Alliance Politics"
Caution is necessary when dealing with
commissions in general and with Germán
government commissions in particular, especially
when they are made up in such a way as to be as
"friendly to the interests of industry" as they are in
this case (Baums and Cromme). In Germany we
suffer from "commis-sionitis".
Trying to reach a pre-agreement ¡n non-political
surroundings, but with a permanent link to the
Chancellor's office or the Ministry of Justice, an
agreement which will later be used to bring
pressure to bear in parliament, is not a desirable
way to go about preparing legislative procedure (or
a behaviour code), ñor is It "politically correct".
Industrial guilds, social classes and the
corresponding class "rights" are things of the past.
Round tables and corporatism are not the way to
start looking for solutions in a parliamentary
democracy.
8. Tasks of the Legislative Body: norms instead of "soft
law"
The Corporate Governance debate has many aspects. The shareholders
ought to - and must - be the centre of attention. However, that does
not hold true in most cases. The centre is already occupied by the
Management Board and the Supervisory Board and their (very) own
interests. A change would do good - but such change is not to be
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expected from commissions ¡n which Management Board members and
Advisory Board members set the pace, ("if you want to dry out a pool,
don't ask the frogs", as the saying goes). As the situation stands
nothing will be achieved without the legislative body. The foliowing are
some of the points at issue:
conflict of ¡nterests (Insider dealings and the handling
thereof).
A simple "enumeration principie" may not be
accepted, because the next loophole will soon be
found. Instead it is necessary to make it clear and
state clearly that - for the good of the company - even
the faintest semblance of a conflict of interests is to
be avoided. This ought really to go without saying and
is not asking too much, Management Board and
Supervisory Board ought to demand more from
themselves than from their employees in order to
prevent the company becoming involved in any kind of
speculative gossip.
the basic outlines of fixed income and the limits on
variable remuneration (Management Board and
Supervisory Board)66.
the criteria of performance-related stock option
programmes with limits (cap) to prevent unreasonable
"self-service" on the part of Management Boards (and
Supervisory Boards) to the detriment of the
shareholders, whereby Supervisory Boards because of
See e.g. DIE WELT dated 8. Mai 2003, P. 16 ("Neue Offenheit ais Anfang"),
FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 14. Mai 2003, P. 29 ("Kreative Rechner ¡n
eigener Sache"), Handelsblatt dated 12. Mai 2003, P. 13 ("Der Druck auf die
Cromme-Kommission wáchst"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung dated 10. Mai 2003,
P. 11 ("300 000 Euro für den Vorsitz im Aufsichtsrat") und P. 15 ("Krá'ftige
Aufschláge für viele deutsche Aufsichtsrate"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung dated
19. Mai 2003, P.20 ("Rogowski: Raffgier be¡ Topmanagern"), Bórsen-Zeitung dated
22. Mai 2003, P. 1 ("Kodex-Kommíssion für gláserne Taschen - Obergrenze bei
Aktienoptionen"), FINANOAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 15. Mai 2003, P. 34
("Keine Geheimnisse"), Der Spiegel dated 19. Mai 2003, P. 86 ff. ("Transparenz für
fette Katzen"), BNANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 22. Mai 2003, P. 17
("Selbstbedienung der Vorstande hat ein Ende"), Zypries in Borsen-Zeitung dated
15. Mai 2003, P. B 7 ("Mehr Anlegerschutz und Transparenz").
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the nature of their duties should be excluded from
such share programmes67.
D&O liability insurance pólices which ¡nclude a
sizeable / reasonable excess (deductible) for
Management Board and Supervisor/ Board68.
tightening up the liability standards, whereby the
means to measure liability is not the issue. The
obstacles which have been introduced to impede
action in cases of liability must be removed, or at least
lowered noticeably (if necessary with the help of court
injunction). In September 2001 an annual meeting of
legal experts ("Juristentag") said all that needed to be
said on the subject69 (and the Baums Commission
agreed)70.
9. Accounting Methods and Year-End Audits: more haste
less speed?
9.1 The same applies to accounting methods and year-end
audits as has been said for the governing bodies
Management Board and Supervisory Board. Caution is
needed in both cases whenever "internationalisation" is
spoken of in connection with globalisation because what
we really are seeing is nothing more than the taking over
of American rules and ideas (US GAAP), which have not
proved themselves during recent crises; on the contrary,
they aided their development or at least made them
possible. US GAAP, IAS or HGB (= Germán commercial
regulations) should be weighed up one against the other
67
 See Deutscher Corporate Govemance Kodex ¡n the versión dated 21.05.2003 under
www. corporate-governance-code.de.
68
 Af ter mos t of t he Germán DAX-companies fai led t o fo l low the recommendat ions of
the Deutschen Corporate Governance Code. See dazu Bernhardt , W. , DER BETRIEB,
H. 17 da ted 25 .04 .2003 , P. I ( "Entsprechenserk lárungen mi t Lücken und Tücken" )
and also FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 068.09 .2003, P. 29 ( "Wenn
Manager ¡hre Pfl icht ver le tzen") .
69
 63 . Deutscher Jur is tentag in Leipzig (September 2000) .
70
 Baums (Hrsg), Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 2001, Rz
73.
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instead of blindly following American examples71. It is
always better - ¡n the ¡nterest of the shareholders - to
have hidden reserves, than being "broke" with no reserves
to fall back on. Standardisation counsellors should proceed
carefully.
- The Aldama Report addresses this issue in a very
competent and professional manner and warns that
caution ¡s necessary72.
9.2 The same also applies for the "chapter" auditors and year-
end audits. Good reputations have been damaged the
world over, damage that will not be repaired overnight.
"Dedarations of ¡ndependence", "reviews" and / or
"enforcement" by prívate or state-run ¡nstitutions are
¡nadequate73. Supporting the Anglo Saxon "fast cióse"
image, as d¡d the Germán (Baums-) commission74,
provides many more questions than it does answers. Is -
even more - time pres-sure really helpful and useful to the
cause than completing things as quickly as possible, but
taking the time required?
As a matter of interest: auditors are something different
and some-thing more meaningful than (merely) the
"assistants" of the Supervisory Board, as is frequently said
71
 See Borsen-Zeitung No. 130 dated 10.07.2003, P. 5 ("Über d¡e Bedeutung deutscher
Bilanzierung gibt es groSe Illusionen"), Handelsbaltt dated 11./12.07.2003, P. 1
("Chirac attackiert IAS-Bilanzierungsregeln"), Zeitler, F.-C, DER BETRIEB, H. 29
dated 18.07.2003 ("Rechnungslegung und Rechtsstaat"), Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung No. 185 dated 12.08.2003, P. 16 ("Die EU ringt um ihre Linie im
Bilanzrecht"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 190 dated 18.08.2003, P. 17
("Wenn ein konservativer Bilanzierer auf IAS umstellt").
72
 Section I I No. 1.2.
73
 Ludewig, Fs zum 60. Geburtstag von Jorg Baetge, IDW.-Ver lag Dusseldorf, 1997
("Unternehmensethik ¡n der Wirtschaftsprüferpraxis") , Ludwig, Die
Wirtschaftsprüfung, H. 12/2002, P. 613-615 ("Ein Appell - nicht nur an die
Wirtschaftsprüfer") . See dazu auch Handelsblatt No. 119 dated 25.06.2003, P. 10
("Wirtschaftsprüfer wehren sich gegen SEC-Kontrolle"), Frankfurter Al lgemeine
Zeitung No. 176 dated 01.08.2003, P. 12 ("Strengere Regeln fü r Wir tschaf tsprüfer") ,
Handelsblatt No. 146 dated 01. /02.08.2003, P. 4 ("Wirtschaftsprüfer sollen fü r
falsche Téstate haf ten") , DIE WELT dated 09.09.2003, P. 12 ("Wir sind keine
Staatsanwálte").
74
 Baums (Hrsg), Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 2 0 0 1 , Rz
276.
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(even if auditors do sometimes like to "hide" behind the
Supervisory Board). The auditors are chosen - annually -
by the Annual General Meeting, thus representing the
owners / shareholders and are therefore independent and
on an equal footing with the Supervisory Board.
10. Shareholders / Annual General Meeting highlight or
necessary evil?
Origin of all - legislative or corporate - rules and regulations is
clarification of the essential question, whose best interests are at issue
when we talk of excellent business management and / or of "best
practice". This is the very core of the principal-agent conflict. Therefore
the answer is simple. The interests of the shareholders (principáis) are
of paramount importance - or at least they ought to be - and not the
wishes of the Management Board or the Supervisory Board (agente).
But in many cases the ¡nterests of the shareholders (principáis) are not
protected at all75.
10.1 One case in point is the question of the physical presence
of the members of the Supervisory Board at the Annual
General Meeting. Whereas ¡n the past the members were
required to be present, a company's articles of association
in the future may include provisions for "certain
circumstances" under which participation of the members
of the Supervisory Board via video or phone transmission
may be acceptable (§ 118 Sec. 2 AktG n.V.), one of the
"fruits" of the Baums Commission76. The members of the
Supervisory Board (on the owners' side) are the
representatives of the shareholders; is ¡t really asking too
much to expect them to "show themselves" once a year
(!) and with their presence demónstrate some interest in
75
 See Bórsen-Zeitung No. 229 dated 27.11.2002, P. 1 ("Der lástige Aktionár"),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 91 dated 17.04.2003, P. 11 ("Aktionáre in
verordneter Unmündigkeit"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 117 dated
21.05.2003, P. 11 ("Aktionáre bremsen Gehaltsexzesse") und P. 15 ("Der Charme
des Aktionársvotums"), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 123 dated 28.05.03
("Dem Aktionár das Wort"), Handelsblatt No. 111 dated 12.06.2003, P. 9 ("Der
forsche Aktionár").
76
 Baums (Hrsg), Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 2001, Rz
125.
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the questions, worries and remarks "their" shareholders
may have? Etiquette would require this at least.
That ¡mportance ¡s attached to the wrong points is
demonstrated more clearly by another part of the report
submitted by the Baums Commission: In the future a
company's articles or the provisions for procedure at
general meetings may include a limit on the length of time
shareholders may speak or request information as well as
restrictions to the list of speakers77.
And as ¡f that were not enough, the number of questions
asked by the shareholders during the general meeting
may be limited (to five questions) per shareholder and
item on the agenda78.
The reasoning behind this is a form protection against so-
called unpopular or predatory shareholders. But an
experienced Chairman does not need such "barriers".
This recommendation by the commission was not taken
into consideraron in the law governing transparency and
disclosure - not yet?
10.2 There is still sufficient cause for concern as prominent
members of both government commissions (Baums und
Cromme) have stately clearly in various interviews that
they attach great of importance to a limitation on the
number of questions admitted and to restrictions on
information. Ideally a general meeting should be
shortened to two to three hours (Kopper79, former
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Deutsche Bank
AG and of DaimlerChrysIer AG, and Breuer80, former
Baums (Hrsg), Bericht der Regierugnskommission Corporate Governance, 2001, Rz
113.
Baums (Hrsg), Bericht der Regierugnskommission Corporate Governance, 2001, Rz
106.
Die ZEIT No. 18 dated 26.04.2001, P. 22 ("Das sind absurde Zustande". Ein
Gesprach mit Hilmar Kopper).
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 207 dated 06.09.2001, P. 14 ("Breuer für
rigoroseres Vorgehen auf Hauptversammlungen"), Bó'rsen-Zeitung No. 229 dated
27.11.2002, P. 1 ("Breuer fordert straffere Hauptversammlungen") und P. 6
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member and Chairman of the Management Board and now
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Deutsche Bank
AG), Others, such as Max Dietrich Kley, President of the
"Deutsche Aktieninstitut" (Germán Share Institute) warn
against "turning the Annual General Meeting into a
schoolroom"81.
Remaining "consistent" Breuer also finds ¡t superfluous
that the Annual General Meeting be required to ratify the
actions of the Management Board and the Supervisory
Board82.
"One must pick the right shareholders", as Breuer said
recently, may well be a desirable solution from
management's point of view83. But this "dream" which is
really management's visión of a company run by the
management for the management and dressed up as a
public Corporation, will not always be fulfilled. In all other
cases the Supervisory Board and - with it - the
Management Board will have to remain content with being
"chosen" by the shareholders and their Annual General
Meeting84.
(Time-) proven business management instead of
newfangeld Corporate Governance.
("Breuer mahnt Reform der Hauptversammlung an"), Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung No. 276 dated 27.11.2002, P. 15 ("Breuer fordert kürzere
Hauptversammlungen").
See Bó'rsen-Zeitung No. 51 dated 14.03.2003, P. 8 ("Schluss mit der
Regulierungshysterie").
See Bórsen-Zeitung No. 184 dated 24.09.2003, P. B 4 ("Die Hauptversammlung in
ihrer derzeitigen Form ¡st überholt").
Breuer in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 58 dated 10.03.2003, P. 21 ("Die
richtigen Aktionáre aussuchen").
The "relegation" of the Annual General Meeting in Germany comes at a time when
the American law-makers and the SEC are putting more emphasis on shareholder
rights! See dazu Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 145 dated 26.06.2003, P. 23
("In Amerika bekommen die Aktionáre mehr Gewicht"); Handelsblatt No. 122 dated
30.06.2003, P. 15 ("Aktionáre sollen Optionen absegnen"); FINANCIAL TIMES
DEUTSCHLAND dated 02.07.2003, P. 22 ("US-B6rsenaufs¡cht stárkt
Aktionársrechte"); FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND dated 16.07.2003, P. 18 ("US-
Aufsicht stárkt Aktionárseinfluss bei Vorstandswahl").
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10.3 By the way: neither the shareholders (ñor the companies)
can expect anything from the employee co-determination,
in particular from the trade unión representatives, in the
Supervisory Board. In the principal-agent conflict the
unions stand firmly on the side of management and not
with the shareholders. Apart from questions of
accountability this can be seen most clearly ¡n connection
with remuneration for Management (and Supervisory)
Boards. There is ampie room here for "reciprocal
agreements"; if it were otherwise, the "explosión" of the
fixed income of numerous Management Boards and the
introduction of the frequently unacceptable stock option
pians could not have taken place. Furthermore, as far as
the Supervisory Boards1 fees are concerned the unions
have their own interests to protect: the amount which is
forwarded to the Hans Bockler-Foundation (an internal
binding agreement), which ¡n turn is obligated to the
unions and their goals, grows with each increment in the
fees85.
So ¡t is quite "in keeping" that the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) is against a
general limit on ttie remuneration of the Board members. See Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung No. 158 dated 11.07.2003, P. 12 ("Gegen Obergrenze für
Aufsichtsrate").
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11. Corporate Governance and the Consulting Business
models and fashions
"Corporate Governance" has become part of the consulting business in
an economically difficult period which tends to be a consulting-
impoverished time for the national and international law firms and
public accountants both at home and abroad, for industrial consulting
and executive search firms and for business and investment banks
(stock optíons) The latest development is corporate governance codes
for mid-sized companies, which may serve to liven up the consulting
business but otherwise makes very little sense86.
As in so many cases, recommendations - which change so rapidly within
such short timeframes - are of more used to the consultants than to the
companies they are supposedly advising. To emphasise the point, one
just needs to think back on one or two of the "trends" we've seen over
the last 10 to 15 years: take overs and mergers are followed by
divestitures; going public by going prívate; one day holding companies
are best, only to be replaced by group head office structures; one day
diversification is needed, next day focus on the core business; one day
outsourdng ¡s needed, the next day its in-sourcing, one day
centralisation is in, the next decentralisation. The list is almost endless.
And also the business with corporate governance will lose interest as
soon as new trends become evident.




And so I come to the end of my statement - or objection - and go back
to the beginning. In a completely different context the Germán
President, Johanens Rau, was recently reported to have said,
"Everything has been said, but not everyone has had his say yet". I
have herewith joined the long line of speakers in the corporate
governance debate. Hopefully not only.
It would be nice if I haven't just repeated what all the others said
before me.
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